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Judicial Elections, Campaign Financing, and Free Speech 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA 
M OST STATES (39 at last count) choose judges through popular elections1 But these 
elections are often quite unlike ordinary polit-
ical campaigns. When judges run for reelection, 
or when lawyers run for judicial office, they are 
typicalJy subject to rules that limit what they 
can say in the course of their campaigns.2 The 
incumbent judges issue rules that are both in-
tended to restrict, and in fact do severely re-
strict, the political speech of judicial candidates 
running for office. These rules are "law" in the 
same sense that rules of evidence or rules of 
civil procedure are law,3 so one should not 
think of such rules as advisory. They have real 
bite, and those who violate them are subject to 
Ronald D. Rotunda is th(: George Mason University Foun-
dation Professor of Law, George Mason University School 
of Law. 
1 A:vrEHICAN JuDICATURE SociETY, JumciAL SELECTION r~; THE 
STATES: APPELLA1E AND GENER.,\L jUR!SDlCTION COURTS 
(Apr. 2002). 
2 ABA MoDEL CoDE oF JuDICIAL Co""'DUCT, Canon 5A 
(1990), reprinted in, THOMAS 0. -MORGAN AND RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, 2002 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RE~ 
SPONS!BIUTY (Foundation Press, 2002), at 758-63. 
3 THOMAS D. MoRGAN AND RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, PROBLEMS 
AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIOI\TAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (Foun-
dation Press, ?th Ed. 2000). 
4 The ABA MoDEL Com: OF JuDiciAL CoNDUCT purports to 
apply to both elected and appointed judges. It is inter-
esting that the Federal Judicial Council, which has 
adopted a version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, explicitly did not adopt a provision of Canon 5 
that explicitly addresses the solicitation of endorsem.ent 
for appointment to judicial office. Canon 513(2) of the ABA 
Model Code provides that: 
"(2) A candidate for appointment to judicial office 
or a judge seeking other governmental office shall 
not engage in political activity to secure the ap-
pointment except that: 
''(a) such persons may: 
"(i) communicate with the appointing authority, in-
cluding any selection or nominating commission or 
other agency designated to screen candidates; 
"(ii) seek support or endorsement for the appoint-
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discipline, which can range up to loss of judi-
cial office (if one is a judge) or disbarment (if 
one is a lawyer running for judge). 
States typically justify these stringent and 
rigid restrictions on various grounds, all of 
which are a subset of a general notion that judg-
ing is not politics and that, therefore, judges 
should not campaign like politicians. tiowever, 
it must be remembered that judges run for of-
fice only because the state constitution of the 
particular jurisdiction mandates political cam-
paigns. 4 States, if they choose, can avoid the 
baggage associated with political campaigns 
for judicial office simply by turning to merit se-
lection of judges5 
ment from organizations that regularly make rec-
ommendations for reappointment or appointment 
to the office, and from individuals to the extent re-
quested or required by those specified in Section 
5B(2)(a); and 
"(iii) provide to those specified in Sections 
5B(2)(a)(i) and 5B(2)(a)(ii) iniormation as to his or 
her qualifications for the office." 
Although the ABA's proposed Judicial Code seeks tore-
strict candidates for appointment to judicial office from 
.seeking support from individuaLs, the drafters of the Code 
of Conduct for U.S. Judges explicitly excluded this language 
in the Code that governs federal judges. The CoDE OF CoN-
DUCT FOR UNITED STATES ]UDGES is reprinted in 175 F.RD. 
364 (1998) and it does not i_nclude this portion of the ABA 
Model Code. See discussion in, RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LEGAL 
ETI-HCS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BJLr!Y § 57-2 (ABA, West Croup, 2nd ed. 2002). 
5 Pennsylvania senior state judge Isaac Garb from Bucks 
County, in commenting on the White case discussed be-
low, argued "judges shouldn't be muzzled," but he also 
favored replacing judicial elections with merit selection. 
In contrast, another senior judge, Carbon County Judge 
John Lavelle, argued that judges should not have to "in-
gratiate themselves to the voting public." Voters should 
instead rely on a "strong, scrutinizing press to do the 
homework" about a judicial candidate's qualifications. 
Charles Meredith, Judges Differ on Gag Rules for Candi-
dates, ALLENTOWN (PENN.) MORNING C-\LL, June 5, 2002 at 
Bl. 
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The question then is whether the First 
Amendment (as applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment) allows judges to 
create rules that, in effect, try to take political 
campaign speech out of political campaigns. 
States, after all, can choose to appoint judges, 
to have merit selection instead of elective cam-
paigns. But, once the state chooses an election, 
can it decide to restrict what the candidates 
say? Can the state conclude that the voters 
must decide among the candidates but that the 
candidates may not tell the voters why they 
should cast their votes? 
The United States Supreme Court answered 
that question in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White6 In that case, a candidate for judicial of-
fice as well as various political groups includ-
ing the Republican Party of Minnesota sued 
state boards and offices who were responsible 
for establishing and enforcing judicial ethics. 
They alleged that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's canon of judicial conduct that prohib-
ited candidates for judicial election from an-
nouncing their views on disputed legal or po-
litical issues violated the First Amendment. The 
U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In invalidating this 
restriction on political speech during the course 
of political campaigns, the Court emphasized 
that this speech is core political speech and that 
it will review with strict scrutiny any laws that 
ban, restrict, or limit such speech. 
Campaign speech is normally considered to 
be well within the essence of the First Amend-
ment. Yet, proponents of restricting such 
speech typically argue that it is necessary tore-
form political campaigns by restricting speech 
in order to "level the playing field" and end 
corruption or the appearance of corruption. To 
the extent that argument has merit, it should 
be strongest in the case of judicial elections be-
cause judges are supposed to decide cases on 
the basis of merit, not on the basis of interest 
groups, pressure politics, and popular wilL 
If that argument fails in the case of judicial 
campaign speech-where any state interests in 
regulating political speech should be at their 
apex-then Republican Party v. White casts a 
long shadow that should extend far beyond the 
rules governing judicial elections7 That case 
applies the strict-scrutiny test with vigor, hold-
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ing that those who seek to justify content-based 
restriction of speech by candidates for public 
office have the burden to prove that any re-
striction is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a 
compelling state interest.8 
Oddly enough, the West headnote for White 
on this point argues that there was only a plu-
rality of Justice on this issue.9 It seems clear 
that it was a majority of the Court that held 
that the proper test is strict scrutiny. The 
Court opinion says that it is a majority opin-
ion and lists the names of the five justices who 
joined it. There were two concurring opin-
ions, both labeled "concurring," and not 
"concurring in part" or 11 concurring in the re-
sult." Justice O'Connor, in her concurring 
opinion makes clear that-"I join the opinion 
of the Court. ... " 10 Justice Kennedy, the only 
other concurring justice, also makes it quite 
clear he understands that the Court uses strict 
scrutiny in this case and that the majority 
opinion explains "in clear and forceful terms 
why the Minnesota regulatory scheme fails 
that test." Right after that he adds, "So l 
join its opinion."11 In other words, he is 
6 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002). 
7 See, 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NowAK, TREATISE 
ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: SuBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 
20.51 (West Group, 3'd ed. 1999). 
8 
"The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper test to 
be applied to determine the constitutionality of such are~ 
striction is what our cases have called strict scrutiny, id., 
at 864; the parties do not dispute that this is correct. Un-
der the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden 
to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly ta~lored, 
to serve (2) a compelling state interest. " 122 S.Ct. 2528, 
2534. 
9 
"Under the strict-scrutiny test, party challenging con-
tent-based restriction of speech by candidates for public 
office has the burden to prove that the restriction is (1) 
narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest. 
(Fer Justice Scalia, with three justices concurring and one 
concurring in the result)." 122 S.Ct. at 2528, headnote [2]. 
See also, 122 S.Ct. at 2528, headnote [3]: "In order for party 
challenging content-based restriction of speech by candi-
dates for public office to show that restriction is narrowly 
tailored under the strict scrutiny test, party must demon-
strate that restriction does not unnecessarily circumscribe 
protected expression. (Per Justice Scalia, with three justices 
concurring and one concurring in the result.)" This head-
note also incorrectly claims that there is no majority opin-
ion. I have written West Publishing Company about this is-
sue and it may be corrected in future printings. 
10 122 S.Ct. at 2542. 
ll 122 S.Ct. at 2544. 
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joining the majority because it uses strict 
scrutiny_l2 
This use of strict scrutiny is controversial af-
ter Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PACJ3 
That case held that Buckley is authority for state 
limits on campaign contributions and that the 
$1000 limit does not have to be inflation-
adjusted. Instead, the question is whether the 
contribution limit is "so low as to impede the 
ability of candidates to 'amass the resources 
necessary for effective advocacy.' "14 The Court 
in Shrink found no evidence that the state re-
striction had failed this forgiving test. 
The White Court does not say that it is over-
ruling Shrink Missouri, or any of its prior deci-
sions. Yet, in Shrink Missouri, Justice Thomas' 
dissent had specifically complained that the 
majority there was abandoning strict scrutiny 
in this line of cases, even though "Political 
speech is the primary object of the First Amend-
ment."15 Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink 
Missouri notes the dissent's objection and re-
sponds that the "mechanical application" of the 
tests associated with strict scrutiny are inap-
propriate in this line of cases16 Later, thought-
ful commentators concluded that Shrink Mis-
souri had abandoned strict scrutiny.l7 
Yet, the majority in White resurrects strict 
scrutiny. In response the dissent is quite placid 
and serene. Only Justice Ginsburg's dissent 
cites Shrink Missouri, and she merely quotes 
from a portion of Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion-not the part rejecting strict scrutiny-
for the proposition that judges should avoid 
prejudgment and not make pledges or 
promises.18 
Now, let us first briefly summarize Republi-
can Party v. White and then consider how some 
of the arguments that proponents of campaign 
restrictions advance might stack up in light of 
the active, strict review in which the White 
Court engaged. 
THE WHITE DECISION AND SPEECH 
ABOUT POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White arose 
in Minnesota. The Minnesota Code of Judicial 
Conduct, like the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, places various limits on the candi-
dates' speech when the state selects its judges 
by election. One rule prohibits a judicial can-
didate or judge from making "pledges or 
promises" on how he will rule in a particular 
case19 A second Minnesota rule of judicial 
ethics prohibits a candidate for judicial office 
from "announcing" a view on any "disputed 
legal or political" issue if the issue might come 
before a court20 This clause prohibits a candi-
date's "mere statement" even if he "does not 
bind himself to maintain that position after 
election. "21 
The ABA Model Judicial Code does not have 
the "announce" provision, but the Minnesota 
state supreme court said that its "announce" 
provision was intended to be similar to another 
provision of the ABA Model Judicial Code that 
prohibits judicial candidates from making 
"statements that commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to cases, controver-
sies or issues that are likely to come before the 
12 One might read Kennedy's opinion as saying that he 
agrees that the opinion of the Court has followed the strict 
scrutiny test in a proper way, and that he joins that opin-
ion in invalidating th(~ law. But, if he had his preferences, 
he would apply an even stricter test than strict scrutiny; 
he would apply a per se rule invalidating such campaign 
restrictions. In the sentence following the one quoted in 
the text, Justice Kennedy says: "I adhere to my view, how-
ever, that content-based speech restrictions that do not 
fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated 
without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling gov-
ernment interests." 122 S.Ct. at 2544. 
13 528 u.s. 377 (2000). 
14 582 U.S. at 397, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
21. 
15 528 U.S. at 410 (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissenting). 
16 528 U.S. at 911 (Justice Breyer, concurring, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg). 
17 Richard L Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, 
and "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave, 17 CONSTJTUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 483 (2000). 
18 122 S.Ct. at 2555 (Justice Ginsburg, dissenting). 
19 Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
5A(3)(d)(il). The corresponding ABA provision is, ABA 
MoDEL CooE OF )umcrAL CoNDUCT, Canon SA (d)(i). 
20 Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
5A(3)(d)(l), which states that judicial candidates may not 
"make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than 
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office; announce his or her views on disputed legal or po-
litical issues." (emphasis added). 
21 122 S.Ct. at 2532. 
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court."22 Minnesota claimed that its "an-
nounce" clause is really the same as the ABA 
"commit or appear to commit" clause. Thus, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court places limita-
tions "upon the scope of the announce clause 
that are not (to put it politely) immediately ap-
parent from its text."23 Nonetheless the U.S. 
Supreme Court accepted this remarkable piece 
of plastic surgery and proceeded to invalidate 
this clause, even with the newly-discovered 
limitations on its breadth. 
In White, Justice Scalia, writing for five mem-
bers of the Court, held that this second prohibi-
tion on judicial candidates violates the First 
Amendment. In order for the announce clause to 
be narrowly tailored, it must not '"mmecessarily 
circumscrib[e] protected expression."'24 The 
Minnesota rule did not meet this test. 
One common view of "impartiality" is no 
bias for or against any party to the proceeding. 
But the clause is not tailored to serve that in-
terest because it does not restrict speech for or 
against particular parties, but rather speech for 
or against particular issues. "Impartiality" in 
the sense of no preconception for or against a 
particular legal view, is not a compelling state 
interest, "since it is virtually impossible, and 
hardly desirable, to find a judge who does not 
have preconceptions about the law."25 Indeed, 
the Minnesota Constitution specifically re-
quires judges to be "learned in the law."26 
Nor does the prohibition promote impartial-
ity in the sense of "openmindedness" because 
the announce clause is "woefully underinclu-
sive.'m For example, a judge may confront a 
legal issue on which he has expressed an opin-
ion while on the bench. "Judges often state their 
views on disputed legal issues outside the con-
text of adjudication, in classes that they con-
duct, and in books and speeches. Like the ABA 
Codes of Judicial Conduct, the Minnesota Code 
not only permits but encourages this." T11e 
Minnesota rule prohibits a judicial candidate 
from saying, "! think it is constitutional for the 
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriage." Yet 
he may say the very same thing, until "the very 
day before he declares himself a candidate, and 
may say it repeatedly (until litigation is pend-
ing) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing 
the objective of open-mindedness that respon-
dents now articulate, the announce clause is so 
ROTUNDA 
woefully underinclusive as to render belief in 
that purpose a challenge to the credulous."28 
The Court, citing a non-judicial election case, 
said what Minnesota may not do is to "censor 
what the people hear as they undertake to de-
cide for themselves which candidate is most 
likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. De-
ciding the relevance of candidate speech is the 
right of the voters, not the State."29 
22 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
5A(3)(d)(ii). The ABA, in the 1972 version of its Model 
Code, had an "announce clause," but, because of First 
Amend1nent concerns, dropped it and replaced it with the 
/(appear to commit" language. See LISA MILORD, THE DE-
vnoP':\1ENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CoDE 50 (1992). Min-
nesota refused to adopt the ABA's new formulation, but 
at oral argument contended that its "announce" clause 
\vas really the same as the ABA provision it had specifi-
cally refused to adopt: 
"At oral argument, respondents argued that the 
limiting constructions placed upon Minnesota's an-
nounce clause by the Eighth Circuit, and adopted 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court render the scope 
of the clause no broader than the ABA's 1990 canon. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. This argument is somewhat cu-
rious because/ based on the same constitutional con-
cerns that had motivated the ABA1 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court was urged to replace the announce 
clause with the new ABA language, but unlike 
other jurisdictions, declined. Final Report of the Ad-
visory Committee to Review the ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the 1\1innesota 
Board on judicial Standards 5-6 (june 29, 1994), 
reprinted at App. 367-368. The ABA, howt~ver, 
agrees with respondents' position, Brief for ABA as 
Amicus Curiae 5. We do not know whether the an-
nounce clause (as interpreted by state authorities) 
and the 1990 ABA canon are one and the same. No 
aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this 
question." 
122 S.Ct. at 2534 n.5. 
23 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2532. 
24 122 S.Ct. at 2534-35, quoting Brown v. Hartlage/ 456 
U.S. 45, 54, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982). 
25 122 S.Ct. at 2536. 
26 Minn. Const., Art. VI, § 5. 
27 122 S.Ct. at 2537. 
28 Id. 
29 122 S.Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy,]., concurring), citing Brown 
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60, 102 S.Ct. 1523,71 L.Ed.2d 732 
(J982). Justice O'Connor also filed a concurring opinion. 
Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting opi.njon, in which Jus--
tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice Gins-
burg, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer, joined. 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued: "In view of the mag-
isterial role judges must fill in a system of justice, a role 
~ha~ r_emoves them .from the partisan fray, States may limit 
JUd1c_1al campaign speech by measures impermissible in 
electiOns for political office." 122 S.Ct. at 2551. 
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Now, let us consider a few recurring issues 
involving campaign reform, in light of the strict 
scrutiny the Court imposed in White. 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
First, let us turn to campaign contributions. 
The White decision does not discuss this issue 
directly, but its aggressive use of strict scrutiny 
and its imposition of a heavy burden on the 
proponents of campaign restrictions raise new 
questions. White does not appear to allow pro-
ponents of restrictions on campaign expendi-
tures and contributions to satisfy this burden 
merely by asserting that contributions and ex-
penditures raise an appearance of corruption 
justifying state regulation. 
When judges run for office, they need cam-
paign funds. It is often asserted or assumed that 
judicial campaign fundraising compromises 
the impartiality of judges. One recent ABA poll, 
for example, concluded that "72 percent of all 
Americans are concerned that the impartiality 
of judges is compromised by their need to raise 
campaign contributions. More than half of the 
respondents said they were 'extremely' or 
'very' concerned."30 This poll result alone is 
enough, in the view of the ABA President, to 
justify substantial changes in the law. 
These poll results certainly raise serious con-
cern, for an impartial judiciary is crucial to the 
rule of law. Yet, do the polls reflect the way 
things are in fact, or merely the way that many 
people fear that they may be? The supposition 
that contributions may corrupt the recipient is 
not implausible, but what if it is false? As Jus-
tice Souter noted in Shrink Missouri, "This 
Court has never accepted mere conjecture as 
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden 
... "31 If the people's fears are unreasonable, if 
the empirical evidence does not support the 
fear of corruption, then perhaps the remedy for 
the fear should focus more on educating the 
people. 
One would think that the proposition that 
contributions corrupt should be easy to exam-
ine as a statistical matter. While legislators or 
members of the executive branch deal with 
many issues and interest groups, judges deal 
with specific parties involving particular mat-
ters. Hence, if these parties (or their lawyers) 
give the judges campaign contributions and the 
judges then rule in favor of these parties (or 
their lawyers), that does not necessarily mean 
that judges are corrupt, but it does mean that 
fear regarding the impartiality of judges mer-
its study. 
Unfortunately, there is not a great deal of rig-
orous empirical work in this area, but what ex-
ists is quite interesting and does not support a 
statistical conclusion that judicial campaign 
contributions are corrosive. One study has fo-
cused on the State of Illinois. Many of the peo-
ple in that state are concerned that campaign 
contributions affect judicial decisions.32 Yet, the 
empirical investigation dealing specifically 
with this state undermines the voters concern. 
Let us turn to that analysis. 
Over the last three election cycles, 34% of the 
cases that the Illinois Supreme Court decided 
involved a case where either a party or the 
lawyer was a campaign contributor33 On the 
30 ABA Journal E-report, August 16, 2002, www. 
abanetorg/journal/ereport/ au16conf.html. This poll re-
sult is not atypicaL For example, a poll by the North Car-
olina Center for Voter Education showed that 84% of the 
600 likely voters surveyed "are concerned about how 
judges raise money for their elections." Campaign con-
tributions "influence judicial decisions," said 74 percent, 
even though 81%, still ~~preferred the election of judges 
over appointment." J. Barlow Herget, Op-ed, It's Time for 
judicial Reform! CHARL01TE (N.C.) OBSERVER, May 3t 2002. 
www .charlotte.com/ mld/ observer I news/3369889 .htm. 
31 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 397 (2000). 
32 A recent poll showed that more than 85 percent of Illi-
nois voters are concerned that political contributions in-
fluence the decisions of judges. Steve Neal, State Needs 
Fairer Way to Pick Judges, Chicago Sun-Times, September 
4, 2002. 
33 See Samantha Sanchez, Illinois Supreme Court: 1\1oney 
in Judicia! Elections, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MoNEY 
IN STATE PoLiTICS, www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/ 
20020129 /lL.phtm!. 
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MoNEY IN STATE PouTJCS de-
veloped the Money in Judicial Polil:ics Project to track con-
tributions and spending in Supreme Court elections in a 
number of states, including Illinois. To compile a com-
plete campaign profile of the court that included at least 
one election for each of the seven sitting Justices, the Proj-
ect collected data for three election cycles· .. -1990, 1992 and 
1994. In these election cycles, 32 candidates sought one of 
the seven positions. 'Ihis study did not include the 
supreme court races of 2000, in which 12 candidates spent 
$7.7 million, because those elected had not yet partici~ 
pated in enough cases to make the process of matching 
contributors and litigants worthwhile. 
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other hand, the vast majority of campaign con-
tributors "had no cases before the Court, and 
most litigants who appeared before the state 
supreme court had not made any campaign 
contributions.34" 
When we look more closely at the cases 
where a party or lawyer was a contributor, 
there is less there than meets the eye. Between 
1991 and 1999,34% of the cases that the Illinois 
Supreme Court heard involved a party, lawyer 
or organization that made a campaign contri-
bution to a Supreme Court justice in 1990 or 
1992, but more than two-thirds of those cases 
involve public attorneys representing the state. 
The state's lawyers were giving contributions, 
but they do not have the same interest in liti-
gation as private lawyers. The state's prosecu-
tors do not work on contingent fees; they do 
not worry about losing their client35 Indeed, 
they should not even worry a bout losing their 
cases if they lose for the right reason: "The duty 
of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely 
to convict."36 The sovereign wins whenever 
justice is done37 
Fewer than 4% of the lawyers who appeared 
before the Supreme Court made a contribution 
to a winning candidate, and one-third of the ju-
dicial campaign funds came from an unlikely 
source of corruption: the candidates them-
selves or from the political parties who backed 
the candidates38 Assuming that the party is not 
fum<eling campaign contributions from donors 
to the particular candidate-assuming, in 
short, that the party is not "laundering" the 
contributions but is merely spending money it 
collects from a great number of individual con-
tributors, then the concept that the political 
party can "corrupt" the views of its candidates 
is peculiar, because the candidates are its can-
didates.39 
Let us look specifically as to whether major 
contributors who had cases before the Illinois 
Supreme Court were more likely to win. The 
average contribution was only $645, but there 
were 68 contributors who gave $5,000 or more 
in the three election cycles that this study in-
vestigated. Of these major contributors, only 
seven out of the 68 even appeared before the 
Court, and these seven lost as many cases as 
they had won.40 
Of course, the fact that there is no statistical 
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correlation between the major contributors to 
the campaigns of justices of the Illinois 
Supre1ne Court and success before that court-
the fact that major contributors were just as 
34 The funds contributed by all parties appearing before 
the Illinois Supreme Court amounted to only 40% of the 
amount that candidates themselves had contributed to 
their own campaigns from their personal funds. These 
contributor-litigants gave 6.6% of the money that the can-
didates raised. 
Remember, that the "vast majority of campaign con-
tributors have no cases before the Court." www.fol-
lowthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 /IL.phtml. 
35 See www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 I 
IL.phtml: "If the publicly employed attorneys are re-
moved from consideration, on the theory that their suc-
cess before the Court is unlikely to be related to their con-
tributions, just J 0.7 percent of cases before the Supreme 
Court involved a contributor. When those contributors 
appeared before the Court, they were more often on the 
losing side than the wiruting side of the case." 
36 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JusTICE, Standard 3-1.2(c), "The Function of the Prosecu-
tor," (ABA 3"' ed. Feb. 3, 1992). 
37 RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LEGAL ETHics: THE LAWYER's DEsK-
BOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 12-4 (ABA-West 
Group 2nd ed. 2002). 
38 See www.followtllemoney.org/reports/il/20020129 /IL. 
phtml. 
11te Court has rejected restrictions on campaign fi-
nancing when an anti-corruption rationale is unlikely to 
exist. See, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 45-47 (1976) (per 
curiam) (invalidating limits on independent expenditures 
because the "advocacy restricted by the provision does 
not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent 
corruption"); Federal Election Commission v. MCFL, 479 
U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (striking limits on campaign expen-
ditures by incorporated political associations because 
spending by such groups "does not pose [any] threat" of 
corruption); Federal Election Commission v. NCPAC, 470 
U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating limits on independent ex-
penditures by political action committees because, in that 
context, "a quid pro quo for improper commitments" was 
only a "hypothetical possibility"); Citizens Against Rent 
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 
290, 297 (1981) (reaffirming that "Buckley does not sup-
port limitations on contributions to committees formed to 
favor or oppose ballot measures " because an anticor-
ruption rationale is inapplicable); First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (holding that 
limits on referendum speech by corporations violate First 
Amendment because "[t]he risk of corruption ... simply 
is not present"). 
39 Cf., Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commit-
tee v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 646-47 
(1996) [Colorado I], holding that First Amendment pro-
hibits application of Federal Election Campaign Act's 
party expenditure provision to expenditures that politi-
cal party has made independently, without coordination 
with any candidate. A separate opinion of Justice Thomas, 
joined as to this part by Chief Justice Relmquist and Jus-
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likely to lose cases before these justices41-does 
not prove that the contributions were not cor-
ruptive. Perhaps, if the contributors had given 
less, they would have lost even more than half 
of their cases. Still, the statistical evidence is 
still relevant because it does demonstrate in 
this state there is no statistical evidence sup-
porting the assertion of corruption. Yet, that as-
sertion is often repeated as if it had the certainty 
of a law of physics, just as the night follows the 
day. 
More recently, the Chicago Daily Law Bul-
letin reported that the "Illinois Supreme Court 
is not as friendly a venue for plaintiffs as many 
believe: plaintiffs lost in nearly two-thirds of 
the tort cases the justices have decided since 
February 2001." Chief Justice Moses W. Harri-
son, considered "the court's staunchest ally of 
the plaintiffs," said, "We're a pretty conserva-
tive court [in tort cases], as far as I'm con-
cerned." The Bulletin concluded that there ap-
tice Scalia, also concluded that the anticorruption ratio-
nale justifying campaign restrictions is inapplicable in the 
context of political parties funding campaigns because 
there is only a minimal threat o£ corruption when a party 
spends to support its candidate or to oppose the com-
petitor to its candidate, whether or not that expenditure 
is made in concert with the candidate. Jd. at 631. 
Colorado I then remanded for the lower court to con-
sider the political party's broad claim that all limits on a 
party's congressional campaign expenditures are uncon-
stitutional on their face, and thus unenforceable even as 
to spending coordinated with a candidate. The district 
court and the Tenth Circuit agreed with this First Amend-
ment challenge, but the Supreme Court reversed, in FEC 
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 
533 U.S. 421 (2001) [Colorado II]. The Court rejected this 
facial challenge to the restriction. "We hold that a party's 
coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly in-
dependent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention 
of contribution limits." 533 U.S. at 465. 
The IThtjority's analysis places an important caveat on 
the anticorruption rationale. The majority was concerned 
that if it gave a party the right to make unlimited coor-
dinated expenditures, that would encourage those peo-
ple wishing to support a nominee to contribute to that 
party (to, in effect, launder their contribution) in order to 
finance coordinated spending for the candidate, thus cir-
cumventing the contribution limits. The majority found 
that the evidence supported this risk, thus entitling the 
government to prevail in its characterization of party co-
ordinated spending as the functional equivalent of contri-
pears to be no correlation between campaign 
contributions from plaintiffs' lawyers and fa-
voritism to plain tiffs. Some of the contributors 
may not be happy with this state of affairs, but 
that only means that the fact that people may 
want to buy influence does not mean that they 
are successful. Chicago personal-injury attor-
ney Joseph A. Power Jr.-whose law firm and 
its partners have contributed $63,000 to Illinois 
Supreme Court candidates in the year 2000-
said that the court's record, in his view, was 
"very disturbing." He added: "Had I known 
ahead of time that the candidates were going 
to take two-thirds of the cases and decide them 
in favor of [the defense], I would have donated 
the money to a good charity42 
There is a similar thorough study of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. It also 
covered a complete campaign profile of the 
state supreme court that included at least one 
election for each of the sitting justices. The in-
butians. For example, while the party claimed that many 
of the contributions to it were small, the evidence showed 
substantial individual· donations with the party acting as 
a matchmaker. 
It is important to realize that, as the majority pointed 
out "all members of the Court agree that circumvention 
is a valid theory of corruption; the remaining bone of con-
tention is evidentiary." 533 U.S. at 456 (footnote omitted). 
As a matter of the evidence in that case, the Court was 
unwilling to invalidate the campaign restriction. This 
need to look at the empirical evidence should also exist 
in the case of judicial campaign contributions. 
40 See www.followthemoney.org/reports/il/20020129/IL. 
rhtml 
1 The private attorneys who contributed to at least one 
member of the Illinois Supreme Court and later appeared 
before that court, in order of funds contributed, are: 
Jerome Mirza, who gave $11,264, appeared in three cases 
and lost all three; Robert A. Clifford, who gave $9,500, ap-
peared in two cases and lost both; Leonard M. Ring, who 
gave $7,750, appeared in tvvo cases, lost one and received 
a split decision in the second; Philip H. Carboy, who gave 
$4A50, appeared in three cases, lost one and had two split 
decisions; Joseph Curcio, who gave $4,100 and appeared 
in one case which he won; and, Patrick A. Salvi who gave 
$3,030 and appeared in only one case, filing an amicus 
brief. Amiel Stephen Cueto gave $3,000 and appeared in 
one case, which he lost. And 66 other attorneys who gave 
less than $3,000 each and had similar mixed results. 
42 Daniel C. Vock, Dem Majority Aside, High Court Learns 
Right, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, September 3, 2002. 
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vestigators collected data for an eight-year pe-
riod, 1990 to 199843 The conclusions are com-
parable. 
During this eight-year period covering five 
election cycles, 89 percent of the cases that the 
Michigan Supreme Court decided involved a 
contributor who was either a party or an at-
torney. Yet, when we look more closely, we 
find that more than half of those cases involved 
a state-employed attorney who had made a 
campaign contribution and who was repre-
senting the state, not a private client, before the 
court.44 Lawyers constituted 23% of the con-
tributors, but at least 80% of these lawyers 
never appeared before the court during the en-
tire time of the study. In Michigan, the judicial 
candidates contributed only 2%, of the total 
funds raised. 
Once again, there is no statistical linkage be·· 
tween contributions and outcomes favorable to 
those who gave the contributions. For example, 
one law firm that had contributed the most to 
judicial candidates over the five election cycles 
gave a total of $344,403, from the firm and 53 
individual attorneys. However, only $41,735 
(12 percent) of that went to winning candidates 
who then became Supreme Court justices and 
the nine lawyers from that firm who actually 
argued cases before the Court gave just $4,532 
to members of the Court. The law firm was in-
volved in 23 cases during that period, four of 
them by filing an amicus brief. Of the remain-
ing 19 cases, they won three, lost four times as 
many (that is, 12) and got split decisions in 
four.45 
A similar study covers the State of Wiscon-
sin. This study also examined a lengthy period 
covering several election cycles, and its results 
are similar to those for Illinois and Michigan. 
For example, during a 10-year period under re-
view, tl1cre were 95 cases involving attorney 
discipline. Nine of these cases involved attor-
neys who had contributed to the justices, and 
in all nine of these cases, the lawyers lost their 
appeals. One law firm with only eight lawyers 
was one of the largest contributors in the state. 
It contributed a total of $8,150 to six Justices. 
That firm argued seven cases before the court, 
winning only two and losing five. As the study 
concludes, "while the practice of giving money 
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to judicial candidates clearly raises questions of 
potential bias, the data does [sic] not support 
such an inference."46 
One robin does not make a spring, and these 
statistics from three major states may not nec-
essarily represent what we might find in other 
jurisdictions. In addition, cases that go before 
appellate courts are often complex, so that it 
may be difficult to determine if a decision is a 
complete victory for any party. The plaintiff 
may win, but the ruling of law may not be ex-
actly what plaintiff desired and might come 
back to haunt plaintiff (particularly if plaintiff 
is an institutional litigant often before a court, 
like a union ur a major corporation). In addi-
tion, even if a contributor wins a case, one can 
argue that he or she might have won anyway, 
so that the contribution was superfluous. 
Nonetheless, these statistical studies do show 
that charges of corruption can only be proven 
by looking at specific situations and motiva-
tions, not by painting with a broad brush and 
assuming that there is a tit for tat between cam-
paign contributions and judicial decisions and 
that therefore laws restricting campaign con-
tributions are necessary because corruption is 
inevitable. 
43 Samantha Sanchez, 11li11ois Supreme Court.· Money in Ju-
dicial £/ecfions, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN 
STATE PoullCS, www.followthemoney.org/reports/mi/ 
20020129 /MLphtml. "Databases were created of all cam-
paign contributions to all winning candidates during the 
study period, and those contributors' names were 
matched against a database of the parties and attorneys 
whose cases were heard by the Supreme Court from 1991 
through 1999. During that time, 26 candidates sought one 
of the seven positions, several of them more than once, 
and raised a total of $9,536,710. The 2000 Supreme Court 
races, where nine candidates spent a total of $6,352,002 in 
just one election, are not included in this study because 
those elected have not yet participated in enough cases to 
make the process of matching contributors and litigants 
worthwhile." 
4·~ See www.followthemoney.orglreportslmil20020129 I 
Ml.phtml. 
45 See www .followthemoney.orglreports/mi 120020129 I 
Ml.phtml. 
46 Samantha Sanchez, Campaign Contribulions and the Wis-
consin Supreme Court-, THE NATlONAL INSTITUTE ON Mol\.'EY 
lN STATE Pouncs, May 9, 2001, www.followthemoney. 
org/ reports I wi I 20010509 /WI. phtml. 
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JUDGES APPOINTING LAWYERS WHO 
HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORS 
There is an inherent difficulty in separating 
campaign contributions that are corrupt from 
campaign contributions that are perfectly proper, 
because the distinction is based on the motive of 
both fhe donor and recipient. One must look at 
motive with fhe precision of a surgeon's scalpel, 
not a butcher's meat axe. 
So too must one deal with precision if there 
is a suspicion that the judge is rewarding a 
donor with a plumb judicial appointment 
instead of a favorable ruling. Judges, for ex-
ample, may appoint a lawyer as a referee, 
commissioner, special master, receiver, or 
guardians, and may ·appoint relatives of a 
lawyer as a clerk, secretary or bailiff. In 1999, 
the ABA focused on this problem when it 
added a new provision to its Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct. The new Canon 3C(5) provides: 
A judge shall not appoint a lawyer to a 
position if the judge either knows that 
the lawyer has contributed more than 
[$ _]47 within the prior [_]48 years to 
the judge's election campaign, or learns of 
such a contribution by means of a timely 
motion by a party or other person prop-
erly interested in the matter, unless 
(a) the position is substantially uncom-
pensated; 
(b) the lawyer has been selected in rota-
tion from a list of qualified and available 
lawyers compiled without regard to fheir 
having made political contributions; or 
c) the judge or another presiding or ad-
ministrative judge affirmatively finds 
that no other lawyer is willing, compe-
tent and able to accept the position.49 
This section corresponds to Rule 7.6 of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity, dealing with lawyers' efforts to make polit-
ical contributions in order to obtain government 
legal engagements or appointments by judges. 5° 
Rule 7.6 also does not paint with a broad brush 
but instead only prohibits law firms or lawyers 
from accepting a government legal engagement 
or an appointment from a judge if the law firm 
or lawyer made or solicited the political contri-
bution "for the purpose of obtaining or being 
considered for that type of legal engagement or 
appointment."51 When bar disciplinary counsel 
objected that the new rule, given its motivation 
component, would be difficult to enforce, the 
proponents basically agreed and argued that it 
was only intended to be enforced in "extreme 
circumstances." Otherwise, it was supposed to 
be "largely self-enforcing. "52 
The new judicial rule, like its corresponding 
rule in the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, reflects the concern that some people 
have about the appearance of impropriety if 
lawyers make a political contribution to the 
judge, and the judge then rewards (or appears 
to reward) those lawyers by appointing them 
as special masters, guardians, receivers, or sim-
ilar positions. Canon 3C(5) provides, in gen-
eral, that a judge should not appoint a lawyer 
to a particular position if the judge learns or 
knows that the appointee has contributed more 
than a certain amount (the local jurisdiction 
sets the amount that triggers this prohibition) 
within a certain period of years (the local ju-
risdiction also sets the relevant time period). To 
some extent it reaffirms a more general provi-
sion, Canon 3C( 4), that instructs judges to ex-
ercise their power of appointment on the basis 
of merit and not on the basis of nepotism 5 3 
Thus, Supruance v. Commission on f udicial 
Qualifications54 held that a judge violated 
Canon 3C(4) when he appointed friends and 
47 Each jurisdiction adopting this provision is supposed 
to insert its own specific dollar amount. 
rl.S Similarly, each jurisdiction adopting this provision is 
supposed to pick a number of years to insert. 
49 RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, LECAL ETHics, TnE LAWYER's DEsK-
nooK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBlL!TY § 60-1_5 at p. 859 
(ABA-West Group, znd ed. 2002) . 
.so ABA MoDEL Rt.::LES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT, Rule 7.6, 
"Political Contributions to Obtain Government Legal En-
gagements or Appointments by Judges." 
:>l ABA MoDEL RuLE 7.6 (emphasis added). 
52 House of Delegates Debate of Feb. 12, 2000, quoted in 
ABA/BNA LAWYH<.'s MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
Current Reports, voL 16, at 64 (Mar. ·t 2000); Report of 
the ABA Section of Business Law and other Sections, Re-
port- with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, Nov. 
23, 1999, at 10. 
53 ABA MoDEL CoDE OF JumciAL CoNDUCT, Canon 3C(4). 
5413 Cal.3d 778, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209 (1975). 
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political supporters to represent indigent de-
fendants in criminal cases. The problem was 
the judge did not appoint on the basis of merit. 
Note the necessity of proving that the judge ap-
pointed for the wrong reason. Once again, the 
court recognized the need to show corrupt mo-
tive, just as federal bribery laws require a quid 
pro quo. Indeed, in one decision a divided court 
refused to censure a judge who had appointed 
his lover as chief cashier, because the lover was 
"well qualified for the appointment."55 
Thus, even the simple prohibition of Canon 
3C(5) recognizes the need for exceptions, 
where the appearance of impropriety is notre-
ally realistic. For example, if the appointed po-
sition is substantially uncompensated, there is 
no real risk that the judge is favoring a polit-
ical contributor, for the simple reason that one 
is not "favored" by being appointed to a job 
that pays nothing or very little. Similarly, 
there is no appearance of impropriety if the 
appointee is selected by rotation from a list 
created without regard to one having made 
political contributions. Nor does this rule ap-
ply if the judge affirmatively finds that no 
other lawyer is willing, competent and able to 
accept the position. 
JUDGES MAKING PROMISES 
Recall that Minnesota argued that a judicial 
candidate should not "announce" his or her 
views in order to preserve the judge's "open-
mindedness," an argument that the Supreme 
Court found "woefully" inadequate."56 It was 
not enough for Minnesota to assert this inter-
est. It had to prove it. While the Court found 
that Minnesota presented no empirical evi-
dence and that its assertions were mere con-
jecture,57 there are illustrations in history that 
do exist, and those examples undercut Min-
nesota's claim. 
As Professor Alexander Bickel once re-
marked, when a President appoints a Justice, 
he shoots "an arrow into a far-distant future 
[and] not the man himself can tell you what he 
will think about some of the problems that he 
will face."58 This simple fact is illustrated by no 
less a judicial titan than Judge Henry Friendly, 
ROTUNDA 
a great judge and prolific author. In one case, 
when one of the parties cited to him one of his 
own articles indicating how an issue should be 
decided, Judge Friendly decided that he dis-
agreed with what he himself had earlier writ-
ten; the genius of the common law system, he 
recognized, is that judges must make the deci-
sions in the context of concrete cases, not in the 
context of law review articles. Judge Friendly 
dissented,59 while the majority relied upon 
Friendly's law review artic!e60 
Judge Friendly did not know how he would 
rule on the legal issue until he had to decide 
the legal issue, even though the Judge had 
thought about the problem and had written an 
article a bout it coming to a firm conclusion, a 
conclusion that he later rejected. 
TI1is instance is no judicial orphan. For ex-
ample, Justice Jackson participated in the deci-
sion of one case that raised an issue on which 
he had earlier written an opinion as Attorney 
General. Jackson concurred in the opinion of 
the Court even though it was contrary to his 
opinion as Attorney GeneraJ61 He recognized 
his shift of views and quoted Lord Westbury 
who had earlier stated (when his Lordship re-
pudiated one of his previous opinions): "I can 
only say that I am amazed that a man of my 
intelligence should have been guilty of giving 
such an opinion. "62 
55 Matter of Delessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743, 759 
(1979) (per curiam). 
56 Jd. 
57 122 S.Ct. at 2437038. 
58 Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 23-24 (quot-
ing Alexander Bickel). 
59 Williams v. Adams, 436 P.2d 30, 35 (2nd Cir. 1970) 
(Friendly, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly (the judge, not 
the author) was vindicated v.rhen the Second Circuit, en 
bane, reversed the panel decision, in 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 
1971) (per curiam). But the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with Henry Friendly, the author, and not Henry Friendly, 
the judge, and it reversed the Second Circuit. Adams v. 
Williams,407 U.S. 143,92 S.Ct. 1921,32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 
60 Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 34 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1970), 
quoting, Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 952 (1965). 
61 McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, (1950). Compare 
340 U.S. at 176, 71 S.Ct. at 233, with 39 Op.Atty.Gen. 504 
(1940). 
62 340 U.S. at 178, 71 S.Ct. at 233. 
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Over a century earlier, Justice Story, ex-
plaining his rejection of his own former opin-
ion, responded as follows: "My own error, 
however, can furnish no ground for its being 
adopted by this Court ... "63 Judges can change 
their mind, and the genius of the common law 
system recognizes that statements or principles 
announced in general may be inapplicable in 
light of the specific facts of a case. 
So too in the ca>e of general campaign reform 
involving free speech issues, the methodology 
of the White case indicates that proponents of re-
strictions will have to back up their assertions 
with examples and empirical studies. 
CAMPAIGN RESTRICTIONS 
AS INCUMBENT 
PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
During the oral argument before the 
Supreme Court in the White case, the justices 
revealed their concern that the judicial restric-
tions at issue appeared to be designed to pro-
tect incumbent judges from criticism from their 
challengers. The restrictions on what judicial 
candidates could say in the course of a politi-
cal campaign did not, of course, apply to in-
cumbent judges when writing their majority 
opinions, or concurrences or dissents. They 
could say whatever they wanted in terms of 
criticizing their colleagues, explaining how 
they would have ruled, why their view is cor-
rect, and so forth. The Minnesota rule restrict-
ing judicial campaign speech did not apply to 
dictum, even when judges knew that newspa-
pers would likely quote that dictum. 
As one justice, in oral argument, said: 
And what we end up with at the end of 
the day is a system where an incumbent 
judge can express views in written opin-
ions, and perhaps otherwise, as well, and 
yet a candidate for that office is somehow 
restricted from discussing the very same 
thing in the election campaign. That's kind 
of an odd system, designed to what? 
Maintain incumbent judges, or what?64 
The White decision and its rationale suggest 
that the Court will be wary of campaign reform 
legislation that is disguised as incumbent pro-
tection legislation. To the extent that cam-
paigning and electioneering become regulated 
industries, the Court is signaling that it will not 
grant the deference to these regulators that it 
grants in situations not implicating the First 
Amendment. White, in short, casts a net that 
will catch far more than overly-restrictive judi-
cial campaign restrictions. White may be a har-
binger of what is to come in any challenges to 
other laws or proposals that restrict free speech 
in the context of political campaigns. 
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment (as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment) 
does not allow judges to impose restrictive 
rules that take political campaign speech out of 
political campaigns. If states choose to elect 
judges instead of appointing them, that choice 
limits the subsequent power of the state to reg-
ulate the judicial elections. 
White may lead states to reconsider the elec-
tion of judges and move more to the federal 
model of merit selection. But the effect of White 
goes beyond that, for the majority opinion 
adopts a template for analysis of campaign 
laws that restrict speech-and that template 
imposes a heavy burden on advancing the re-
striction. 
Judicial campaign speech is different from 
campaign speech of members of the legislative 
and executive branches, because judges are 
supposed to decide cases based on the law and 
the facts, not based on what is popular at the 
moment. Politicians are supposed to be re-
sponsive to the public will, but judges are not 
supposed to be politicians. 
63 United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 478, 
6 L.Ed. 693 (1827). 
64 Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 2002 WL 
492692, 70 USLW 3612, U.S. Oral Argument, Mar 26,2002, 
transcript at pp. 34-35. 
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Yet, even in the case of judicial campaign 
speech, the Court imposes a heavy burden on 
those who place barriers and restrictions. If that 
burden is heavy and difficult to surmount in 
that case, then a fortiori it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to surmount in the case of non-judicial 
campmgns. 
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